Which Of These Groups Would Have Supported The Five-Power... ~ Legacy News

CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 12 1921-FEBRUARY 6, 1922. Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922.Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, Signed at Article I. The Contracting Powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty. On the completion of these two ships, the North Dakota and Delaware, shall be...Treaty signed at Washington February 6, 1922; proces-verbal of deposit. The Contracting Powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty. On the completion of these two ships the North Dakota and Delaware shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II...The Washington Naval Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty, was a treaty among the major nations that had won World War I, which by the terms of the treaty agreed to prevent an arms race by limiting naval construction.Five-Power Naval Treaty, one of seven treaties negotiated at the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments (1921-1922). Settlement of Far Eastern questions, principally through the Four-Power and Nine-Power treaties, made possible the 1922 Naval Treaty of Washington, which...

Conference on the limitation of armament, 1922.

The Five-Power Treaty, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy was the cornerstone of the naval disarmament program. This treaty replaced the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, which had been a source of some concern for the United States. In the years following World...Which of these groups would have supported the Five-Power Naval Treaty of 1922? Why was the United States at the forefront in negotiating many of the international treaties of the 1920s? (5 points). The U.S. was regarded as a fair and neutral nation.Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty | Facts, History, & Significance. "An essential corollary to these ship limitations was Article XIX of the treaty . The significance of this nonmilitarization agreement meant that no two of the powers could launch an offensive attack on each other, and thus the naval...The Five-Power Treaty signed at the conference formalized the "5:5:3 ratio limit" which restricted total capital ship tonnage for the U.S. and Royal While much of the information that the U.S. Navy's attaches in Japan collected was openly available, it would have remains uncollected and unexploited...

PDF Limitation of naval armament (Five-Power Treaty or Washington...)

The Nine-Power Treaty or Nine Power Agreement was a 1922 treaty affirming the territorial integrity of China as per the Open Door Policy. The Volunteers split into those who supported the treaty who were the "Free State Army" under the leadership of Michael Collins and those who were against the...Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty, arms limitation treaty signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy on February 6, 1922. The agreement fixed the respective numbers and tonnages of capital ships to be possessed by the navies of each of the contracting nations.In 1934, Japan terminated the Five-Power Naval Treaty of 1922, which had limited its naval power in the Pacific. In 1937, Japan invaded China. As the delegates debated whether or not to impose economic sanctions against Japan, the United States announced it would not support sanctions.The Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, by which the USA, Britain, France, Italy and Japan (5 powers, therefore Five-Power Treaty) agreed to limit their navies. The USA, Britain and Japan agreed not to build any new battleships and cruisers for 10 years, and to keep certain ratio between their fleets.The naval treaty was concluded on February 6, 1922. Ratifications of that treaty were exchanged in Washington on August 17, 1923, and it was The most extreme form of this ideology was supported by the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in the Third Reich until the end of World War II. the territory that a state or...

Jump to navigation Jump to go looking Washington Naval TreatyLimitation of Naval ArmamentSigning of the Washington Naval Treaty.SortArms keep watch overContextWorld War ISignedFebruary 6, 1922LocationMemorial Continental Hall, Washington, D.C.EffectiveAugust 17, 1923ExpirationDecember 31, 1936Negotiators Charles Evans Hughes Arthur Balfour Albert Sarraut Carlo Schanzer Katō TomosaburōSignatories Warren G. Harding George V Alexandre Millerand Victor Emmanuel III YoshihitoParties United States British Empire French Third Republic Kingdom of Italy Empire of JapanLanguageEnglishWashington Naval Treaty, 1922 at Wikisource

The Washington Naval Treaty, often referred to as the Five-Power Treaty, was a treaty signed throughout 1922 among the major Allies of World War I, which agreed to stop an hands race via limiting naval development. It was negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference, held in Washington, D.C., from November 1921 to February 1922, and it used to be signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. It limited the building of battleships, battlecruisers and plane carriers via the signatories. The numbers of other categories of warships, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, were not restricted via the treaty, however the ones ships had been restricted to 10,000 tons displacement each.

The treaty used to be concluded on February 6, 1922. Ratifications of that treaty had been exchanged in Washington on August 17, 1923, and it was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on April 16, 1924.[1]

Later naval arms limitation meetings sought additional boundaries of warship building. The phrases of the Washington Naval Treaty were changed via the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936. By the mid-Thirties, Japan and Italy renounced the treaties, whilst Germany renounced the Treaty of Versailles which had limited its military. Naval arms limitation become increasingly more tough for the other signatories.

Background

Immediately after World War I, Britain still had the international's biggest and maximum powerful army, followed via the United States and extra distantly by way of Japan, France and Italy. The British Royal Navy had interned the defeated German High Seas Fleet. The Allies had differing reviews relating to the ultimate disposition of the Imperial German Navy, with the French and Italians wanting the German fleet divided between the victorious powers and the Americans and British wanting the ships destroyed. The negotiations became mostly moot after the German crews had scuttled most of their ships.

News of the scuttling angered the French and the Italians, with the French in particular unimpressed with British explanations that the fleet guarding the Germans had then been away on workouts. Nevertheless, the British joined their allies in condemning the German movements, and no credible evidence emerged to suggest that the British had collaborated actively with the Germans with admire to the scuttling. The Treaty of Versailles, signed soon after the scuttling of the German High Seas Fleet, imposed strict limits on the length and the number of warships that the newly-installed German government was allowed to construct and deal with.

The Americans, the British, the French, the Italians and the Japanese had been allies right through World War I, but with the German danger reputedly finished, a naval arms race between the erstwhile allies gave the impression most likely for the following few years.[2] US President Woodrow Wilson's administration had already announced successive plans for the enlargement of the US Navy from 1916 to 1919 that would have ended in an enormous fleet of 50 fashionable battleships.[3]

In response, the Japanese Diet in the end accredited development of warships to enable the Japanese Navy to attain its purpose of an "eight-eight" fleet programme, with eight modern battleships and 8 battlecruisers. The Japanese started paintings on four battleships and four battlecruisers, all of which had been a lot greater and extra powerful than those of the categories that they have been replacing.[4]

The 1921 British Naval Estimates deliberate four battleships and four battlecruisers, with another four battleships to follow the next yr.[2]

The new palms race used to be unwelcome to the American public. The US Congress disapproved of Wilson's 1919 naval enlargement plan, and the 1920 presidential election marketing campaign caused politics to renew the non-interventionalism of the prewar technology, with little enthusiasm for endured naval growth.[5] Britain additionally could unwell have the funds for any resumption of battleship construction, given the exorbitant price.[6]

In past due 1921, the US changed into conscious that Britain was once making plans a conference to speak about the strategic situation in the Pacific and Far East regions. To forestall the convention and to satisfy domestic calls for for an international disarmament conference, Warren Harding's management called the Washington Naval Conference in November 1921.[7]

The Conference agreed to the Five-Power Naval Treaty in addition to a Four-Power Treaty on Japan and a Nine-Power Treaty on China.[8]

Negotiations

At the first plenary consultation held November 21, 1921, US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes offered his country's proposals. Hughes provided a dramatic starting for the convention through pointing out with resolve: "The way to disarm is to disarm".[9] The ambitious slogan received enthusiastic public endorsement and likely abbreviated the convention while helping make certain his proposals have been in large part followed. He therefore proposed the following:

A ten-year pause or "holiday" of the construction of capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers), including the quick suspension of all building of capital ships. The scrapping of existing or planned capital ships to present a 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio of tonnage with recognize to Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy respectively. Ongoing limits of both capital ship tonnage and the tonnage of secondary vessels with the 5:5:3 ratio.Capital ships

The proposals for capital ships have been in large part accredited by the British delegation. However, they had been controversial with the British public. Britain may no longer have ok fleets in the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Far East simultaneously, which provoked outrage from portions of the Royal Navy.

Nevertheless, there was massive demand for the British to agree. The possibility of struggle with the Americans was once more and more thought to be simply theoretical, as there have been very few coverage variations between the two Anglophone powers. Naval spending was once additionally unpopular in Britain and its dominions. Furthermore, Britain was once enforcing primary decreases of its finances as a result of of the submit–World War I recession.[10]

The Japanese delegation was once divided. Japanese naval doctrine required the repairs of a fleet 70% the length of that of the United States, which was felt to be the minimum essential to defeat the Americans in any next warfare. The Japanese envisaged two separate engagements, first with the U.S. Pacific Fleet and then with the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. It calculated that a 7:Five ratio in the first combat would produce enough of a margin of victory so as to win the next engagement and so a 5:Three ratio was unacceptable. Nevertheless, the director of the delegation, Katō Tomosaburō, preferred to accept the latter to the prospect of an hands race with the United States, as the relative industrial power of the two nations would reason Japan to lose such an palms race and possibly suffer an financial crisis. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Japanese had most effective 55% of capital ships and 18% of the GDP of the Americans.

Akagi (Japanese ship firstly planned as a battlecruiser however converted throughout building to an plane service) in an instant sooner than her release in April 1925.

His opinion used to be adverse strongly via Katō Kanji, the president of the Naval Staff College, who acted as his leader naval aide at the delegation and represented the influential "big navy" opinion that Japan had to prepare as totally as conceivable for an inevitable conflict in opposition to the United States, which could construct indefinitely more warships because of its large industrial power.

Katō Tomosaburō was once finally able to influence the Japanese top command to simply accept the Hughes proposals, but the treaty was for years a source of controversy in the military.[11]

The French delegation initially responded negatively to the concept of lowering their capital ships tonnage to 175,000 lots and demanded 350,000, moderately above the Japanese restrict. In the end, concessions regarding cruisers and submarines helped persuade the French to agree to the prohibit on capital ships.[12]

Another factor that used to be considered crucial by the French representatives was once the Italian request of really extensive parity, which used to be thought to be to be unsubstantiated; however, drive from the American and the British delegations led to the French to simply accept it. That was once considered a super luck by the Italian government, but parity would by no means actually be attained.[13]

There used to be a lot discussion about the inclusion or exclusion of particular person warships. In particular, the Japanese delegation was willing to retain their latest battleship Mutsu, which have been funded with nice public enthusiasm, together with donations from schoolchildren.[14] That ended in provisions to permit the Americans and the British to construct an identical ships.

Cruisers and destroyers HMS Hawkins, lead ship for her class of heavy cruisers alongside a quay, probably right through the interwar duration

Hughes proposed to restrict secondary ships (cruisers and destroyers) in the similar proportions as capital ships. However, that was once unacceptable to both the British and the French. The British counterproposal, in which the British would be entitled to 450,000 tons of cruisers in attention of its imperial commitments but the United States and Japan to simply 300,000 and 250,000 respectively, proved similarly contentious. Thus, the idea of proscribing total cruiser tonnage or numbers used to be rejected fully.[12]

Instead, the British prompt a qualitative prohibit of long run cruiser building. The prohibit proposed, of a 10,000 ton most displacement and 8-inch calibre weapons, was once intended to allow the British to retain the Hawkins class, then being built. That coincided with the American necessities for cruisers for Pacific Ocean operations and in addition with Japanese plans for the Furutaka class. The suggestion used to be followed with little debate.[12]

Submarines

A major British demand all through the negotiations was once the entire abolition of the submarine, which had proved so effective towards them in the conflict. That proved not possible, particularly as a result of French opposition, which demanded an allowance of 90,000 heaps of submarines,[15] and the convention ended without an settlement to restrict submarines.[16]

Pacific bases

Article XIX of the treaty additionally prohibited the British, the Japanese and the Americans from developing any new fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific Ocean area. Existing fortifications in Singapore, the Philippines and Hawaii may stay. That used to be a significant victory for Japan, as newly-fortified British or American bases would be a serious problem for the Japanese in the event of any future struggle. That provision of the treaty essentially assured that Japan would be the dominant power in the Western Pacific Ocean and was once crucial in gaining Japanese acceptance of the limits on capital send development.[17]

Terms

Tonnage barriers Country Capital ships Aircraft carriers British Empire 525,000 lots(533,000 tonnes) 135,000 heaps(137,000 tonnes) United States 525,000 heaps(533,000 tonnes) 135,000 tons(137,000 tonnes) Empire of Japan 315,000 lots(320,000 tonnes) 81,000 lots(82,000 tonnes) France 175,000 heaps(178,000 tonnes) 60,000 lots(61,000 tonnes) Italy 175,000 tons(178,000 tonnes) 60,000 lots(61,000 tonnes)

The treaty strictly limited each the tonnage and construction of capital ships and aircraft carriers and included limits of the size of particular person ships.

The tonnage limits defined through Articles IV and VII (tabulated) gave a energy ratio of roughly 5:5:3:1.75:1.Seventy five for the UK, the United States, Japan, Italy, and France, respectively.[18]

The qualitative limits of each and every type of ship were as follows:

Capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers) had been restricted to 35,000 lots same old displacement and weapons of no higher than 16-inch calibre. (Articles V and VI) Aircraft carriers have been restricted to 27,000 heaps and may just raise not more than 10 heavy guns, of a maximum calibre of Eight inches. However, every signatory was once allowed to use two existing capital send hulls for aircraft carriers, with a displacement prohibit of 33,000 heaps each (Articles IX and X). For the functions of the treaty, an plane service was once outlined as a warship displacing more than 10,000 lots built completely for launching and landing plane. Carriers lighter than 10,000 lots, therefore, didn't rely towards the tonnage limits (Article XX, part 4). Moreover, all aircraft carriers then in service or building (Argus, Furious, Langley and Hosho) have been declared "experimental" and not counted (Article VIII). All other warships were restricted to a most displacement of 10,000 tons and a most gun calibre of 8 inches (Articles XI and XII).

The treaty also detailed by means of Chapter II the particular person ships to be retained by each and every military, including the allowance for the United States to complete two additional ships of the Colorado category and for the UK to finish two new ships based on the treaty limits.

Chapter II, section 2, detailed what was once to be executed to render a boat useless for army use. In addition to sinking or scrapping, a limited number of ships might be converted as target ships or coaching vessels if their armament, armour and other combat-essential parts have been removed totally. Some is also converted into plane carriers.

Part 3, Section II specified the ships to be scrapped to conform to the treaty and when the closing ships could be replaced. In all, the United States had to scrap 30 current or planned capital ships, Britain 23 and Japan 17.

Effects

The treaty arrested the proceeding upward pattern of battleship size and halted new development fully for greater than a decade.

The treaty marked the end of a protracted length of will increase of battleship development. Many ships that had been being built were scrapped or converted into aircraft carriers. Treaty limits had been revered after which prolonged through the London Naval Treaty of 1930. It was once not until the mid-Thirties that navies started to construct battleships as soon as once more, and the power and the size of new battleships started to extend as soon as again. The Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 sought to increase the Washington Treaty limits until 1942, however the absence of Japan or Italy made it largely useless.

There had been fewer results on cruiser building. The treaty specified 10,000 lots and 8-inch guns as the most length of a cruiser, but that used to be additionally the minimum size cruiser that any navy was once keen to construct. The treaty began a building pageant of 8-inch, 10,000-ton "treaty cruisers", which gave further motive for fear.[19] Subsequent naval treaties sought to deal with that by means of restricting cruiser, destroyer and submarine tonnage.

Unofficial results of the treaty included the finish of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Although it used to be now not phase of the Washington Treaty by any means, the American delegates had made it clear that they would no longer agree to the treaty unless the British ended their alliance with the Japanese. [20]

Violations

In 1935, the French Navy laid down the battleship Richelieu; combined with the two Dunkerque-class battleships also beneath construction, which placed the overall tonnage over the 70,000-ton limit on new French battleships till the expiration of the treaty. The keel laying of Jean Bart in December 1936, albeit less than three weeks sooner than the treaty expired, increased the magnitude of France's violation by way of every other 35,000 lots. The French government brushed aside British objections to the violations by stating that Britain had signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935, which unilaterally dismantled the naval disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. German naval rearmament threatened France, and in step with the French perspective, if Britain freely violated treaty obligations, France would in a similar way now not be constrained.[21]

Italy many times violated the displacement limits on person ships and tried to stay inside of the 10,000-ton restrict for the Trento-class cruisers built in the mid-Nineteen Twenties. However, through the Zara-class cruisers in the overdue Twenties and early 1930s, it had abandoned all pretense and built ships that topped 11,000 long heaps (11,000 t) by a large margin. The violations persevered with the Littorio-class battleships of the mid-Thirties, which had an ordinary displacement in excess of 40,000 lengthy lots (41,000 t). The Italian Navy nonetheless misrepresented the displacement of the vessels as being within the limits imposed by the treaty.[22]

Japanese denunciation

Japanese denunciation of the Washington Naval Treaty, 29 December 1934

The naval treaty had a profound impact on the Japanese. With awesome American and British industrial power, an extended warfare would very most likely result in a Japanese defeat. Thus, gaining strategic parity used to be now not economically conceivable.[23]

Many Japanese considered the 5:5:Three ratio of ships as any other snub by way of the West, but it can be argued that the Japanese had a greater drive concentration than the US Navy or the Royal Navy. The terms also contributed to controversy in high ranks of the Imperial Japanese Navy between the Treaty Faction officials and their Fleet Faction warring parties, who had been additionally allied with the ultranationalists of the Japanese army and different portions of the Japanese executive. For the Treaty Faction, the treaty used to be one of the factors that had contributed to the deterioration of the dating between the American and the Japanese governments.

Some have also argued that the treaty was one major factor in prompting Japanese expansionism via the Fleet Faction in the early 1930s. The belief of unfairness resulted in Japan's renunciation of the Second London Naval Treaty in 1936.

Yamato during sea trials, October 1941. It displaced 72,800 tonnes at complete load.

Isoroku Yamamoto, who later masterminded the attack of Pearl Harbor, argued that Japan will have to stay in the treaty. His opinion used to be more complex, alternatively, in that he believed the United States could outproduce Japan by means of a greater factor than the 5:Three ratio as a result of of the massive American manufacturing advantage of which he had professional wisdom since he had served with the Japanese embassy in Washington. After the signing of the treaty, he commented, "Anyone who has seen the auto factories in Detroit and the oil-fields in Texas knows that Japan lacks the power for a naval race with America." He later added, "The ratio works very well for Japan – it is a treaty to restrict the other parties."[24] He believed that different methods than a spree of construction would be had to even the odds, which would possibly have contributed to his advocacy of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor.

On December 29, 1934, the Japanese govt gave formal understand that it intended to terminate the treaty. Its provisions remained in force officially until the finish of 1936 and weren't renewed.[25]

Influences of cryptography

What was unknown to the individuals of the Conference was that the American "Black Chamber" (the Cypher Bureau, a US intelligence provider), commanded by means of Herbert Yardley, was spying on the delegations' communications with their house capitals. In specific, Japanese communications have been deciphered completely, and American negotiators were ready to get the absolute minimal imaginable deal that the Japanese had indicated they would ever settle for.[26]

As the treaty used to be unpopular with a lot of the Imperial Japanese Navy and with the more and more energetic and vital ultranationalist groups, the worth that the Japanese govt authorised used to be the motive of a lot suspicion and accusation among Japanese politicians and naval officials.

References

^ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 25, pp. 202–227. ^ a b Marriott 2005, p. 9. ^ Potter 1981, p. 232. ^ Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 174. ^ Potter 1981, p. 233. ^ Kennedy 1983, p. 274. ^ Marriott 2005, p. 10. ^ .mw-parser-output cite.citationfont-style:inherit.mw-parser-output .citation qquotes:"\"""\"""'""'".mw-parser-output .id-lock-free a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-free abackground:linear-gradient(transparent,transparent),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Lock-green.svg")appropriate 0.1em center/9px no-repeat.mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .quotation .cs1-lock-registration abackground:linear-gradient(clear,clear),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat.mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-subscription abackground:linear-gradient(clear,transparent),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg")correct 0.1em middle/9px no-repeat.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registrationcolour:#555.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription span,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registration spanborder-bottom:1px dotted;cursor:help.mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon abackground:linear-gradient(transparent,transparent),url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg")correct 0.1em middle/12px no-repeat.mw-parser-output code.cs1-codecolour:inherit;background:inherit;border:none;padding:inherit.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-errorshow:none;font-size:100%.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-errorfont-size:100%.mw-parser-output .cs1-maintshow:none;color:#33aa33;margin-left:0.3em.mw-parser-output .cs1-formatfont-size:95%.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-leftpadding-left:0.2em.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-rightpadding-right:0.2em.mw-parser-output .citation .mw-selflinkfont-weight:inherit"Washington Conference | 1921–1922". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 6 April 2019. ^ Jones 2001, p. 119. ^ Kennedy 1983, pp. 275–276. ^ Evans & Peattie 1997, pp. 193–196. ^ a b c Marriott 2005, p. 11. ^ Giorgerini, Giorgio (2002). Uomini sul fondo : storia del sommergibilismo italiano dalle origini a oggi. Milano: Mondadori. pp. 84–85. ISBN 978-8804505372. ^ Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 197. ^ Marriott 2005, pp. 10–11. ^ Birn, Donald S. (1970). "Open Diplomacy at the Washington Conference of 1921–2: The British and French Experience". Comparative Studies in Society and History. 12 (3): 297–319. doi:10.1017/S0010417500005879. ^ Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 199. ^ "Limitation of Naval Armament (Five-Power Treaty or Washington Treaty)" (PDF). Library of Congress. 1922. ^ Marriott 2005, p. 3. ^ Howarth 1983, p. 167. ^ Jordan & Dumas 2009, pp. 98–99, 152. ^ Gardiner & Chesneau 1980, pp. 290–292. ^ Paine 2017, p. 104-105. ^ Howarth 1983, p. 152. ^ Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 298. ^ Duroselle 1963, p. 156.

Sources

Baker, A. D., III (1989). "Battlefleets and Diplomacy: Naval Disarmament Between the Two World Wars". Warship International. XXVI (3): 217–255. ISSN 0043-0374. Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1963), From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945, Harvard University Press, ISBN 978-0-67432-650-7 Evans, David & Peattie, Mark (1997), Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-0-87021-192-8. Gardiner, Robert & Chesneau, Roger, eds. (1980). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-913-8. Howarth, Stephen (1983), The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, Atheneum, ISBN 978-0-689-11402-1 Jones, Howard (2001), Crucible of energy: a historical past of US international relations since 1897, Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 978-0-8420-2918-6 Jordan, John (2011), Warships after Washington: The Development of Five Major Fleets 1922–1930, Seaforth Publishing, ISBN 978-1-84832-117-5 Jordan, John & Dumas, Robert (2009). French Battleships 1922–1956. Barnsley: Seaforth Punblishing. ISBN 978-1-84832-034-5. Kaufman, Robert Gordon (1990), Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars, New York: Columbia University Press, ISBN 978-0-231-07136-9 Kennedy, Paul (1983), The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, London: Macmillan, ISBN 978-0-333-35094-2 Marriott, Leo (2005), Treaty Cruisers: The First International Warship Building Competition, Barnsley: Pen & Sword, ISBN 978-1-84415-188-2 Paine, S.C.M. (2017), The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge, ISBN 978-1-107-01195-3 Potter, E, ed. (1981), Sea Power: A Naval History (2d ed.), Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-0-87021-607-7 Limitation of Naval Armament, treaty, 1922

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Friendship and Commerce between Mexico and Japan (1888) Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1894) Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the USA (1894) Italo–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1894) Japan-China Peace Treaty (1896) Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Brazil and Japan (1895) Treaty for returning Fengtian Peninsula (1895) German–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1896) Komura-Weber Memorandum (1896) Yamagata–Lobanov Agreement (1896) Japan–China Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1896) Franco–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1896) Japan–Netherlands Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1896) Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Chile and Japan (1897) Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Argentina and Japan (1898) Nishi–Rosen Agreement (1898) Japan-Thailand Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty (1898) Boxer Protocol (1901) Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) Japan-China Additional Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1903) Japan–Korea Treaty of 1904 Japan–Korea Agreement of August 1904 Japan-Russia Treaty of Peace (1905) Taft–Katsura settlement (1905) Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905 Additional Agreement of the Japan-China Treaty in terms of Manchuria (1905) Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1907 Japan–Korea Treaty of 1907 Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 Root–Takahira Agreement (1908) Japan-China Agreement in relation to Manchuria and Jiandao (1909) Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1910 Japan–Korea Treaty of 1910 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the USA (1911) Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1911) North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911 Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1912World War I–II(1913–1945) Japan-China Treaty of 1915 Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1916 Lansing–Ishii Agreement (1917) Japan-China Co-defense Military Pact (1918) Treaty of Versailles (1919) Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (1919) Svalbard Treaty (1920) Gongota Agreement of 1920 Treaty of Sèvres (1920) Treaty of Trianon (1921) Four-Power Treaty (1921) Nine-Power Treaty (1922) Treaty relating to solution of Shandong problems (1922) Washington Naval Treaty (1922) Treaty of Lausanne (1923) Klaipėda Convention (1924) Soviet–Japanese Basic Convention (1925) German–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1927) Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928) Japan-China Customs Agreement (1930) London Naval Treaty (1930) Cease Fire Agreement in Shanghai (1932) Japan-Manchukuo Protocol (1932) Tanggu Truce (1933) India-Japan Agreement of 1934 Japan-Manchukuo-Soviet Protocol for Cession of North Manchuria Railway (1935) He–Umezu Agreement (1935) Chin-Doihara Agreement (1935) Canada-Japan New Trade Agreement (1935) Japan-Netherlands Shipping Agreement (1936) Anti-Comintern Pact (1936) Hart-Ishizawa Agreement (1937) India-Japan Agreement of 1937 Van Mook-Kotani Agreement (1938) Arita-Craigie Agreement (1939) Tripartite Pact (1940) Japan-China Basic Relations Treaty (1940) Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration (1940) Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact (1941) Japan-Thailand Offensive and Defensive Alliance Treaty (1941) Japanese Instrument of Surrender (1945)During the Cold War(1945–1989) Security Treaty between the United States and Japan (1951) Treaty of San Francisco (1951) Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952) Treaty of Peace between Japan and India (1952) Treaty of Peace between Japan and Burma (1954) Japan–Philippines Reparations Agreement (1956) Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 Treaty of Peace between Japan and Indonesia (1958) Japan–South Vietnam Reparations Agreement (1959) Japan–US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960) Tokyo Convention (1963) Japan–South Korea Treaty (1965) Ogasawara Reversion Agreement (1968) Okinawa Reversion Agreement (1971) Japan–China Joint Communiqué (1972) Japan–North Vietnam Agreement (1973) Japan–China Trade Agreement (1974) Basic Treaty between Japan and Australia (1976) Sino–Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978) Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Washington_Naval_Treaty&oldid=1007490487"